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The Risk Management Agency has greatly expanded avail-ability of Group Risk Income 
Protection (GRIP) for 2006. Covered 
crops now include corn, soybeans, 
grain sorghum, wheat, and cotton in 
most major production regions. Now 
that GRIP is widely available, many 
farmers and their crop insurance 
agents are considering whether GRIP 
could be the right crop insurance 
choice for 2006. As we will show, the 
answer varies by farm and produc-
tion region.
What Is GRIP and 
How Does It Work?
GRIP provides protection against 
unexpected declines in county rev-
enue. This contrasts with Revenue 
Assurance (RA) and Crop Revenue 
Coverage (CRC), which provide pro-
tection against declines in revenue 
at the farm level. Thus, a farmer who 
buys GRIP could suffer a loss and 
not receive an insurance payment. 
This would occur if his or her farm 
yield is low but the county yield is 
not. However, many farmers fi nd 
that their farm yield is rarely low 
unless the county yield is low. These 
are the farmers who are most likely 
to fi nd GRIP benefi cial.
First, a few program details and 
defi nitions will help in understand-
ing how GRIP works. GRIP pays an 
indemnity whenever actual county 
revenue falls below a trigger revenue 
level. Actual county revenue equals 
the product of the harvest price and 
the county average yield. The trigger 
revenue equals the product of se-
lected coverage level (90, 85, 80, 75, 
or 70 percent) and expected county 
revenue. Expected county revenue 
equals the product of expected 
county yield and expected price. 
Expected county yield is simply the 
trend yield for a county. The ex-
pected price is based on the futures 
price before sales closing date for 
crop insurance.
An often-confusing aspect of 
GRIP is that, unlike RA and CRC, the 
amount of insurance that a farmer 
buys is not equal to the trigger 
revenue. Rather, farmers select an 
amount of insurance between 90 
and 150 percent of expected county 
revenue. 
When actual county revenue 
falls below the trigger revenue, an 
indemnity is paid. The amount of 
the indemnity equals the product 
of the amount of insurance and the 
percent loss, where the percent loss 
is computed as the difference be-
tween the trigger revenue and the 
actual county revenue divided by 
the trigger revenue.
Finally, just as RA and CRC of-
fer farmers extra protection when 
the harvest price climbs above 
the expected price, so too does an 
optional endorsement to GRIP. The 
endorsement is called the Harvest 
Revenue Option (HRO). If a farmer 
selects this endorsement (and 
pays the addition premium), then if 
the actual harvest price is greater 
than the expected harvest price, 
the amount of protection and the 
trigger revenue are multiplied by 
the ratio of the actual price to the 
expected price.
Comparing GRIP 
to Other Products
To illustrate how GRIP is likely to 
perform in the future relative to RA 
and CRC, we calculated what GRIP 
would have cost and what it would 
have paid out from 1980 to 2004 
had it been available during that 
Figure 1. Net indemnities for 90 percent GRIP-HRO and 75 percent 
RA-HPO for Poweshiek County, Iowa, corn coverage, 1980-2004
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time. We assumed that the maximum 
amount of insurance was obtained 
with GRIP-HRO at the 90 percent cov-
erage level. For comparison, we also 
estimated what the cost and aver-
age payout for RA (with the harvest 
price option) and CRC would have 
been over the same period at the 75 
percent coverage level. These cover-
age levels were chosen to equalize 
the premium subsidy percentage 
among the insurance products.
Net indemnities (insurance pay-
out minus producer-paid premium) 
are shown in Figure 1 for corn in 
Poweshiek County, Iowa; Figure 2 for 
wheat in Barnes County, North Da-
kota; and Figure 3 for dryland cotton 
in Lubbock County, Texas. A positive 
number indicates that indemnities 
paid out exceed what the producer 
would have paid in premium. 
Figure 1 shows that GRIP-HRO 
pays out much more often and a 
higher amount than does RA in 
Poweshiek County. There are two 
reasons for this. The fi rst is that 
GRIP-HRO has a 90 percent trigger 
and RA has a 75 percent trigger, 
which means that a price drop like 
we saw in 2004 will more readily 
trigger a payout under GRIP than 
under RA. The second reason is that 
losses at the farm level are highly 
correlated with losses at the county 
level. This means that whenever 
there are signifi cant farm-level 
losses, there will also be signifi cant 
county-level losses. The techni-
cal terms describing this situation 
are that losses on corn in Iowa are 
primarily driven by systemic factors 
such as widespread drought or ex-
cess rainfall (factors affecting many 
farms in the area at the same time) 
and not by poolable factors such as 
wind, hail, or disease (factors affect-
ing only individual farms).
The results in Figure 2 and Fig-
ure 3 show that insurance losses 
on North Dakota wheat and Texas 
cotton are driven by both systemic 
and poolable factors. The years in 
which GRIP pays out a large amount 
are also the years when RA and 
Figure 2. Net indemnities for 90 percent GRIP-HRO and 75 percent 
RA-HPO for Barnes County, North Dakota, wheat coverage, 1980-2004
Figure 3. Net indemnities for 90 percent GRIP-HRO and 75 percent CRC 
for Lubbock County, Texas, non-irrigated cotton coverage, 1980-2004
CRC pay out a large amount, which 
shows that systemic risk is impor-
tant in both regions. But note the 
number of years in which RA or CRC 
pay out but GRIP does not. For both 
the wheat and cotton examples, we 
estimate that there would have been 
positive net average payouts for RA 
but negative net payouts for GRIP in 
6 out of the 25 years. This illustrates 
that for these crops, poolable risk is 
much more important than it is for 
Iowa corn. 
These illustrations show that 
whether GRIP is the right crop 
insurance choice for a farmer de-
pends in part on whether a farm-
er’s losses are driven primarily by 
poolable risk or systemic risk. One 
way to estimate the importance of 
the two is to graph a farm’s histori-
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cal yield against the county average 
yield. If the scatter plot forms close 
to a straight line with a positive 
slope, then farm yields and county 
yields are highly correlated and GRIP 
may provide good risk management 
benefi ts. If the scatter plot is widely 
variable with no real discernable pat-
tern, then poolable risk is important 
and the farmer ought to think twice 
before buying GRIP.
Besides the risk management 
benefi ts, crop insurance products 
can boost average farm incomes 
because of the premium subsidies. 
Farmers pay only 45 percent of the 
total premium if they buy RA or CRC 
at the 75 percent coverage level or 
GRIP at the 90 percent coverage 
level. The Risk Management Agency 
tries to set the total premium at 
a level that would generate suffi -
cient premiums to just cover losses 
over the long term. That is, they 
hope that if many farmers buy their 
products over many years, then the 
indemnities paid out would about 
equal the total premium. In other 
words, the total premium is sup-
posed to represent an actuarially 
fair premium.
If premiums are actuarially fair, 
then farmers who buy RA or CRC at 
the 75 percent coverage level or GRIP 
at the 90 percent coverage level 
should receive $100 in indemnity for 
every $45 they pay in premium, for a 
net return of $55. That is, the expect-
ed rate of return from investments in 
farmer-paid premiums should be 122 
percent (1.22 = .55/.45) if premiums 
are actuarially fair.
Table 1 reports the historical 
rates of return for the products and 
time periods illustrated in Figures 1, 
2, and 3. The average rate of return 
for GRIP over this period across 
the three examples equals 123 
percent. Given the way that GRIP 
premium rates were developed, all 
three crops would have generated 
approximately 122 percent rates of 
return if the historical period had 
been extended back to 1957.
The rates of return to RA and 
CRC are all positive, indicating that 
farmers should expect to receive 
more in indemnities than they pay 
in premiums. But they are also all 
less than 122 percent, which could 
indicate premium rates that are 
in excess of actuarially fair levels. 
Furthermore, the expected returns 
(net indemnities) to GRIP are sub-
stantially greater than for RA and 
CRC. This refl ects both the higher 
expected rate of return and (for 
corn and wheat) the higher liability 
and premium per acre. Poweshiek 
County corn producers would have 
received $17/acre more in net in-
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demnities for GRIP than for RA over 
the historical period. 
Recommendations
The large rates of return for GRIP are 
to be expected because of the large 
premium subsidies. Putting the GRIP 
decision into gambling terms, farm-
ers get to bet $55 of house money 
for every $45 they bring to the table. 
With those odds, it is no wonder that 
GRIP pays out in the long run.
But crop insurance is more than 
a gamble: it also keeps farmers in 
business. The real danger in us-
ing GRIP for crop insurance is that 
even with good odds, catastrophes 
do happen. A hailstorm or localized 
fl ooding can destroy a farmer’s crop 
when the county has a bumper crop. 
Or a regional drought can devastate 
a farmer who operates at the edge of 
a county, while leaving farms in the 
rest of the county untouched. From a 
risk management perspective, GRIP 
is ideally suited for farmers who are 
well diversifi ed geographically in a 
county. For these farmers, GRIP can 
provide both a high rate of return on 
premium dollars as well as effi cient 
risk management benefi ts. ◆
Note of disclosure: Bruce Babcock 
helped develop GRIP,  GRIP-HRO, and 
RA as a private consultant. He has 
no current fi nancial interest in any of 
these products. 
